Report 73 Business Practices Committee15. Conclusion |
VdDussen's undertaking to "buy back" the shares of his clients, whether the shares bought were in Omnisure or RRB, was misleading. Statements such as "... should they (the shares) not be worth R5O 000 or more three years from the date of purchase thereof' and "... should the shares be worth less than R1 million three years from the date of the purchase thereof, I will buy back the shares at R400 000" was a designed move to mislead his clients. The moneys invested by his clients at times became available because he advised the clients to surrender their policies.
As an "Economic Risk Analyst" VdDussen should and must have known that the "guarantees" were not worth the paper it was written on. No "analyst" in his right mind would dream to give a written guarantee that a particular share would be worth Rx in three year's time. These guarantees gave the investors, who were apparently financial illiterates, a sense of security. This sense of security was further supported by the fact that VdDussen in some cases offered the investors, and their wives, job opportunities. His long-winded use of Afrikaans and at times non-sensical economic jargon contributed to his clients' confusion.
By his own admission VdDussen sold "some of his" Metanoia shares to at least two shareholders. The deal between himself and Coetzee did not materialise and VdDussen did not have the Metanoia shares to sell. It is not a crime to sell something that one does not own. The question, however, is whether VdDussen knew at the time that he sold the shares that he stood little or no chance to obtain ownership thereof.
On 8 March 1997 he sold the "KEER" model to Coetzee. Coetzee used this "model" in Dia-Logos to advise their clients about the restructuring of their insurance portfolios. The model or concept was thus already put to use and the crux thereof was certainly not a close guarded secret. Yet, VdDussen still kept on accepting investment from clients under the pretext that the model or system or process or concept was being futher developed.
In March 1998 he wrote to a shareholder that the concept "... has the potential of a billion rand industry" and that he was "... willing to go to jail for that I believe in and anyone who alleges that he/she does not know for what I stand, does not want to know it". After discussions with some investors it was clear that they had no idea what the concept was all about, notwithstanding VdDussen's contention that "... anyone who alleges that he/she does not know for what I stand, does not want to know it". It is also not clear why VdDussen is "... willing to go to jail" for that he believes in. Unless of course, he harbours feelings of guilt.
By his own admission and verified through the documents mentioned in this report, VdDussen accepted funds from new investors to pay interest to previous investors and in some cases, to redeem their investments. This business practice was applied during VdDussen's involvement with Omnisure, RRB, RealityNet and the consortiums During the meeting with the Committee on 8 October 1998 VdDussen was requested to immediately stop this practice. Investors ceased to receive the "interest" on their investments and on 22 January 1999 they were told at a meeting that there was "... no more money. It is likely that, had the Committee not intervened, VdDussen would have continued his "investment" practices.
VdDussen's "development" of his process/concept/modeI and his vision of its application in a billion Rand industry led to him to accept funds from clients. These funds were used partly to finance his businesses and to roll over monies to his clients.
The clients were promised huge returns. Now no money is available and the intangible asset, the concept, does not seem to have any commercial value to the investors
VdDussen has a history of accepting "investments" from his clients and partly utilising these funds to finance his businesses, the "development" of his concept and to pay previous investors. He should be stopped from doing so. Should his concept have the "... potential of a billion rand industry", financiers would bent over backwards to finance him.